We analyse direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) in the prescription drug market, when a regulator imposes a …ne for misleading advertisements (truth-in-advertising regulation) and doctors face pressure to contain prescribing costs. The e¢ cacy of a drug is based on scienti…c evidence as well as on patient-speci…c characteristics.
Introduction
The marketing of ethical medicines is a highly regulated activity. In the U.S. An open question is whether increased regulation or monitoring will discipline advertisers as intended. Nelson (1974) pointed out that truth-inadvertising regulation may have the perverse e¤ect of encouraging more advertising, since regulation enhances the credibility -and therefore the value -of advertisements. Sauer and Le-er (1990) found some empirical support for Nelson's hypothesis. However, Nelson does not consider markets with "learned intermediaries"who might contradict the advertised message.
The present paper develops a signalling model in which a patient consults a physician about whether to take a new drug after observing DTCA. The patient's treatment decision is based on what they infer from DTCA as well as the doctor's recommendation. Drug advertising is randomly audited for truthfulness.
We assume that physicians face pressure to limit prescribing of expensive new drugs -as in a managed care environment -so physicians are imperfect agents of their patients. Nevertheless, in the absence of DTCA, patients comply with their physicians' suggested treatments. Advertising changes equilibrium behaviour in the physician-patient consultation by encouraging the patient to challenge a physician who recommends against the advertised drug. In the model, DTCA distorts the physician's recommendation towards the advertised drug and also leads to greater levels of con ‡ict with patients. We examine two types of market-stealing equilibria in detail: one in which all advertising is truthful, and another in which some advertising is false.
Although we do not characterise all equilibria of the model, our results are nevertheless general in the following sense: if DTCA is used in equilibrium, 1 then the level of prescribing of the advertised drug will be higher than under a scenario in which DTCA is banned.
There have been a number of empirical studies of the e¤ects of DTCA on prescribing (e.g., Berndt et al., 1995 Berndt et al., , 1997 and Kalyanaram (2008 Kalyanaram ( , 2009 ) …nd that DTCA increased the market share of the advertised drug. Wosinska (2002) also …nds a market stealing e¤ect of DTCA, but only when the drug is subsidised for the patient.
There is also evidence that this market-stealing e¤ect might work by encouraging patients to request the advertised medicine. Liu and Gupta (2011) analyse prescribing data for patients newly diagnosed with hyperlipidemia, and …nd that DTCA has a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on patient requests for the advertised brand. In Kravitz et al. (2005) actors were randomly assigned to make 298 unannounced visits to physicians. They found that 37% of patients requesting a named brand received a prescription for the drug, compared to 10% of patients who made a general drug request and none of the patients who did not request any drugs. They conclude that as long as DTCA can persuade patients to mention a brand, physicians can be induced to change their prescribing decisions.
Previous theoretical analyses of DTCA have tended to focus on market expansion e¤ects, rather than market stealing. Brekke and Kuhn (2006) analyse the interaction between DTCA, price setting and detailing (marketing to physicians). They model DTCA as directly informative: consumers do not question the truthfulness of advertised messages, and are prompted to visit their physicians by learning the advertised information. By contrast, we assume that patients visit their physicians whether or not they see DTCA, but our patients do not unquestioningly believe the content of DTCA. Our model explains why DTCA may persuade consumers to switch drugs, despite their rational incredulity and the intermediation by physicians. In Brekke and Kuhn, it is detailing that drives the prescribing decision, which is made by the physician. There is no detailing in our model (though this an obvious avenue for further research), and patients have sovereignty over the prescribing decision. The exercise of this sovereignty is limited, however, by the need to pay a "con ‡ict cost"to reject the physician's recommendation.
Rubin and Schrag (1999) likewise treat DTCA as directly informative.
Intensity of advertising increases brand awareness, which in turn encourages the HMO to place the drug on its formulary. Rubin and Schrag show that tighter regulation, which imposes higher compliance costs on the advertiser, can have ambiguous e¤ects if DTCA is a strategic complement to price.
With higher-cost advertising, the drug company advertises less and charges a lower price. This reduces awareness amongst consumers but the lower price increases consumption amongst the brand-aware consumers.
Neither of these papers addresses the credibility of DTCA or the regulation of content.
We explore the e¤ect of truth-in-advertising regulation -the frequency of auditing and the penalties for false advertising -on the incentive to advertise.
Stricter regulation may increase the credibility of DTCA and may therefore lead to increased DTCA and more physician-patient con ‡ict. Stricter regulation may even help to support false advertising. Our paper therefore challenges the presumption that tighter, or better enforced, truth-in-advertising rules are e¤ective mechanisms for reducing the harmful e¤ects of DTCA.
A critical assumption of our model is that physicians are imperfect agents of their patients. Physicians employed by an HMO or managed care organisation may face cost-containment mechanisms such as utilisation reviews, capitation of provider payments and selective contracting with providers, all of which challenge the physician's autonomy and reduce the emphasis on maximising health gain. They may therefore be less inclined to prescribe expensive new drugs than their patients would like. 2 were distributed across fee-for-service and a variety of managed care plans.
They found that patients under the managed care schemes were statistically signi…cantly less likely to trust their physicians to put their health ahead of costs.
Patients in managed care schemes therefore face two biased sources of information: the producers of expensive new drugs and their own physicians.
This complicates the patient's treatment decision, but creates an opportunity for drug producers to o¤set managed care pressure against prescribing their 2 Under the Medicaid "fail …rst"regime, doctors are required to try a cheaper drug …rst, while some drugs require the doctor to complete paper work and obtain prior approval to prescribe. With the advent of Medicare Part D, Medicare bene…ciaries can also enrol in HMO-type arrangements which include prescription drugs. The share of drugs with utilisation management requirements amongst these type of plans increased from 18% in 2007 to 28% in 2011, with prior authorisation being the most pervasive management strategy. Prior authorisation imposes costs on doctors (Epling, Mader and Morley, 2014) and encourages them to switch their prescribing to drugs for which prior authorisation is not needed (Law et al., 2010) .
products. Because the drug producer's bias is in the opposite direction to that of the physician, there is scope for DTCA to be e¤ective in persuading the patient to insist on the new drug, even if this means going against his physician's advice.
The model
A population of patients is being treated for a chronic condition and regularly visit their physicians. 3 Patients have a common von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function which depends on health, the level of any co-payments and the level of con ‡ict with the doctor. 4 Each patient is currently being treated with generic drug , but a new, patented medication has just been introduced to the market.
All agents, including patients, are aware of the existence of and the conditions that it is designed to treat 5 but are uninformed about its e¢ cacy.
The latter is determined by:
(i) The average quality of , as revealed by the randomized controlled trial (RCT) data. This is known to both the pharmaceutical …rm and the physician.
(ii) Patient-speci…c factors which determine the quality of the match between the patient and the drug. These are ascertained by a medical examination, so are known only to the physician.
For a given patient, the e¢ cacy of drug is indexed by the state s 2 S = [s; 1], where s < 0. The state determines the additional health gain from taking rather than (net of any co-payment for drug ), expressed 3 According to the U.S. General Accounting O¢ ce (2002), all of the 15 most heavily advertised drugs in 2000 were treatments for chronic conditions. 4 A precise speci…cation of utility is given below. 5 We exclude brand awareness as a motivation for DTCA. This is often established through media campaigns (Cassels et al., 2003) .
in vNM utils. The state is unobserved by the patient, but is known to the physician at the time of consultation.
The consultation game
We …rst describe a physician-patient consultation game in which the patient visits the physician for a drug recommendation.
At the time of consultation, the patient has prior beliefs over S described by the distribution function F . Later we introduce advertising by pharmaceutical …rms, in which case F will incorporate anything the patient has inferred about drug quality from DTCA. For now, though, we take F as
given and explore what happens during the patient-doctor consultation.
We model this consultation process as a signalling game. Nature selects the state s 2 S according to the distribution F . The physician ("she") 
, where p (r) is the probability that t = given recommendation r. Thus, strategies indicate the probability of recommending/choosing drug .
A con ‡ict occurs whenever the patient's treatment choice is di¤erent from the physician's recommendation. The doctor and patient su¤er some disutility from con ‡ict (c d > 0 and c p > 0, respectively).
The patient's vNM utility payo¤ is
where I [ ] denotes the indicator function and v is the treatment bene…t from drug . Since payo¤s are expressed in vNM utils, our model imposes no particular risk attitude on patients. 6 The doctor's vNM utility payo¤ is :
The utility penalty 2 (0; 1), which is imposed when is prescribed (t = ), embodies the doctor's bias against . Apart from this bias, the physician's utility function re ‡ects altruistic preferences (or a competitive pressure to maximise patient utility).
With these payo¤s, the physician is an imperfect agent of the patient.
When s 2 (0; ) the patient and physician disagree about the preferred treatment: the patient would like but the physician prefers the cheaper alternative, . We assume that the patient understands the doctor's incentives; in particular, patients know the value of . Since none of our results depends on the value of v, we set v = 0 henceforth. 8 We also make the following: 6 To clarify, imagine a patient who derives vNM utility u (H; M ) from his level of health H and his monetary wealth M . This function embodies the patient's attitude to risk in these two dimensions. We impose no restrictions on its curvature. Let denote a "fundamental"state space that summarises the relative health bene…t from taking rather than . Then H is a function of ( ; t), where 2 is the state and t 2 f ; g is the treatment; while M is a function of t. Moreover, H ( ; ) is constant in . Let v = u (H ( ; ) ; M ( )) be the vNM utility from treatment . We may therefore transform the "fundamental" state space into a our state space S by de…ning:
In other words, u (H ( ; ) ; M ( )) = v + s ( ). We therefore de…ne the patient's vNM utility as v + s ( ) less any con ‡ict cost (and drop the redundant reference to ). The patient's risk attitude is incorporated in the change of variable: the transformation of into s. This implies that the patient's prior distribution (F ) over S will be a¤ected by his risk attitude. However, once S and F are speci…ed, risk attitude plays no further role in the analysis. 7 See the Introduction for a discussion of this assumption.
Assumption 1
The distribution F is continuous with support [!; 1] for some ! 2 [s; 0). It is strictly increasing on its support and satis…es F (!) = 0.
By an "equilibrium" of the consultation game, we shall mean a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) that satis…es the Intuitive Criterion (IC). 9 To simplify matters -at least initially -we focus on equilibria which are responsive and state monotonic:
De…nition 1 An equilibrium is responsive if the patient responds di¤er-ently to each recommendation: In a non-responsive equilibrium, the patient ignores the doctor's recommendation. One such equilibrium -a Beta equilibrium -is discussed below.
However, we shall set aside the non-responsive equilibria for now.
There is something obviously counter-intuitive about equilibria that violate state monotonicity, though these too may exist. Proposition 2 implicitly acknowledges them, but we do not give any explicit consideration to such equilibria.
The following simple observation is useful for the analysis of responsive equilibria: the physician is indi¤erent about her recommendation in state s .
9 Because of con ‡ict costs, the consultation signalling game is not of the "cheap talk"
variety, so the IC has bite in disciplining o¤-equilibrium beliefs. 10 All proofs are in the Appendix. It turns out that there always exists such an equilibrium, and it is essentially unique (in a sense made precise in Proposition 1). The nature of the equilibrium depends on whether lies above or below the following parameter:
Note that s > 0 by Assumption 1. The following lemma clari…es the role of parameter s.
Lemma 2
Given s 2 (!; 1), the condition
is equivalent to s s.
Condition (2) but > s, the patient will reject the recommendation. In this case, the physician cannot hope to get her own way in all states.
Proposition 1 There always exists a responsive and state monontonic equilibrium with s (de…ned in Lemma 1) lying in (!; 1). If s, then in any such equilibrium:
If > s, then in any such equilibrium:
We call an equilibrium satisfying (3) a physician knows best equilibrium (PKBE). In any PKBE, the physician recommends her preferred treatment in every state and the patient accepts either recommendation.
An equilibrium satisfying (4) is called a con ‡ict equilibrium (CE). In such an equilibrium, the physician refrains from recommending drug in states above s, which is less than . Even so, the patient rejects r =^ with strictly positive probability:
Proposition 1 says that the consultation game always possesses a PKBE or a CE, and that the value of s determines which equilibrium exists. We will focus on these equilibria in what follows.
In the next section we argue that the producer of drug may be able to use DTCA to shift s. It can do so if its advertising alters the distribution F .
Note that F re ‡ects the patient's beliefs about the net bene…t from drug , and may be amenable to DTCA.
12
If advertising is successful in shifting s from a value above to a value below , the nature of the consultation game changes: from one with a PKBE (but no CE) to one with a CE (but no PKBE). This change may therefore increase the set of states in which is recommended, as well as ensuring that is prescribed with positive probability in the remaining states. This is a market stealing e¤ect, and will raise the drug …rm's pro…t. 13 Note that a downward shift in s implies that the patient becomes more optimistic about the net bene…t of drug : more states must be excluded from the top end of the support of patient beliefs to maintain indi¤erence about accepting or rejecting r =^ . E¤ective DTCA must therefore persuade the consumer that drug quality is higher than his prior belief. Section 4 shows that DTCA may be persuasive in equilibrium.
The following two subsections discuss alternative equilibria of the consultation game, and the possibility of purifying the CE to obviate the need for patient randomisation. They may be skipped without loss of continuity.
Alternative equilibria
The consultation game may (indeed, will) possess other equilibria, besides the PKBE or CE. Is it reasonable to focus on just these two?
When s the PKBE has a compelling logic. As noted previously, if s the physician can recommend her preferred drug in every state and be con…dent that the patient will be willing to accept the recommendation without argument. It seems natural to assume that she will do so.
We can also show:
then a PKBE exists and Pareto dominates any other equilibrium.
Condition (5) implies
s and hence the existence of a PKBE. Under the stronger condition (5), when Pareto dominance is used as an equilibrium selection criterion, it selects the PKBE.
The Supplementary Material has further discussion of equilibria, besides those of the PKBE form, that exist when s but (5) does not hold.
The Supplementary Material also considers alternative equilibria (to the CE) when > s. It is shown that the only other state monotonic equilibria are ones in which is recommended and prescribed with probability 1 in every state. We call this a Beta equilibrium (BE). Of these two types of equilibria -the CE and the BE -the former better matches the empirical evidence on the e¤ects of DTCA. Both types of equilibria imply an increase in the prescribing of drug relative to the PKBE (i.e., a market stealing e¤ect), but only the CE predicts an increase in patient-doctor con ‡ict, which is a well-known side-e¤ect of DTCA (Kravitz et al., 2003). 14 
Purifying equilibria
At the cost of some elaboration of the model, it is possible to dispense with the need for patient randomisation in equilibrium. 15 We will sketch the required elaboration here, though the rest of the paper works with the nonelaborated model for simplicity.
Suppose that patients are heterogeneous in their con ‡ict costs, with c p distributed according to a continuous distribution function G, which is strictly increasing on its support. If the doctor cannot observe c p (but knows G) patient responses may be stochastic from the doctor's perspective even if no patient type actually randomises.
Let H denote the distribution function for s induced by the distribution G over con ‡ict costs. 16 Consider a putative equilibrium in which there is some 14 The Supplementary Material discusses the robustness of our conclusions to allowing BE-inducing DTCA. 15 Our thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this possibility. 16 Note that s > 0 when c p = 0 by Assumption 1. Moreover, s is strictly increasing in s 2 (0; ] such that the doctor chooses r =^ when s 2 [!; s ) and r =^ when s 2 (s ; 1]. All patient types will accept the latter recommendation (since s > 0). In the putative equilibrium, the doctor will expect the former recommendation to be accepted with probability 1 H (s ) (Lemma 2). The necessary and su¢ cient condition for this putative equilibrium to exist is that
so that the doctor is indi¤erent about which recommendation to make in state s (Lemma 1). This indi¤erence condition may be written
Since c d > 0, it is easy to see that equation (6) such that s in (1) exceeds (respectively, falls short of) s accept (respectively, reject) recommendation^ . The probability of rejecting r =^ is thus given by (6).
With this "puri…ed"equilibrium, persuasive DTCA will shift the distribution H, which will change the solution to (6) . For example, if the common patient beliefs described by F become more optimistic about drug quality, then s will fall for every patient type and the new H will lie to the left (…rst-order stochastically dominate) the old. From Figure 1 we observe that this will give a lower solution for s , so there will be more states in which the doctor recommends drug and more patients who reject r =^ . In other words, persuasive DTCA raises the pro…t of the drug …rm through a market stealing e¤ect. 
DTCA as a signal of quality
Suppose that drug comes in n possible quality levels, indexed by q 2 f1; :::; ng, and a drug of quality q has e¢ cacy distribution F q . The quality of drug is ascertained through scienti…c evidence (i.e., RCT data). This trial data is known to the pharmaceutical company and to the physician, 17 but not to the patient.
In the consultation game, the distribution F represents the patient's prior beliefs about drug e¢ cacy. These beliefs will incorporate any information the patient has gleaned from DTCA. In the absence of DTCA, we assume that patients assign prior probability q 2 (0; 1) to quality q. Therefore, if DTCA is banned, the patient's beliefs are represented by
Assumption 2 For each q 2 f1; :::; ng, the distribution F q is continuous
. It is strictly increasing on its support and satis…es F (! q ) = 0.
We index drugs such that lower q values imply higher quality -think of q as the drug's quality rank. We assume that drug q has a quality advantage over drug q + 1 in the following sense:
18 Assumption 3 Distribution supports satisfy
and, for every q 2 f1; 2; :::; n 1g, distribution F q strictly dominates distribution F q+1 in the sense of the reverse hazard rate order. That is,
is strictly increasing on (! q ; 1). In particular (see Shaked and Shanthikumar, 1994 , Section 1.B.6):
for any z 2 (! q ; 1).
18 Assumption 3 implies that F q …rst-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) F q+1 , but is stronger. We thank a referee for pointing out the need for this stronger condition.
Note that since F q (1) = F q+1 (1), we can only have F q (s) =F q+1 (s) strictly increasing on (! q ; 1) if ! q+1 < ! q . Hence the restriction on the supports.
Condition (7) says that, conditional on learning s 2 [s; z], patients expect a higher net health bene…t from drug when it is of quality (rank) q than when it is of quality (rank) q + 1.
De…ning
, an immediate consequence of Assumption 3 is that s q s q+1 for any q 2 f1; 2; :::; n 1g, with strict inequality if s q < 1.
Suppose, for example, that s 1 < s, where s is de…ned by (1) for
If DTCA is banned, the consultation game possesses a PKBE (since s) and the physician writes her favoured prescription in every state. However, if 's true quality is q = 1 and the producer of drug ("…rm ") could credibly convey this information to the patient, the PKBE would no longer be viable (since s 1 < ) and the CE may be played instead.
This would increase revenue for …rm .
Suppose that …rm has an opportunity to advertise to patients prior to patients consulting their doctors. The sequence of moves is now as follows:
1. Nature chooses the drug quality. Quality q is chosen with probability q .
2. Firm observes q and choses an action from A = f?; 1; 2; :::; ng, where ? denotes no advertising and a 2 f1; 2; :::; ng is an advertised claim that q = a. 4. The physician observes q, s and a and makes her recommendation to the patient (r 2 n^ ;^ o ). 19 We assume that the producers of do not advertise. If drug is a well-known, o¤-patent medication and competitively supplied, then it is reasonable to suppose that the producers of have no incentive to advertise.
5. The patient observes a and r and decides on treatment (t 2 f ; g).
The payo¤s to the physician and patient are the same as in the consultation game. Firm 's payo¤ depends on its sales and its advertising costs.
We shall treat stages 3-5 of the game as a "representative"consultation, and assume that …rm earns total revenue (net of production costs) equal to R if is prescribed at the end of the typical consultation. If action a 2 A f?g is chosen in stage 2, the drug …rm pays an additional advertising cost K > 0.
Advertisements are audited with probability 2 [0; 1] and if a 6 = q, a …ne 0 is imposed.
The drug …rm is risk neutral, maximising expected pro…t. If drug is of quality q and prescribed with probability in the typical consultation, its expected pro…t is
Consider a scenario in which the PKBE exists (and is played) when DTCA is banned. Furthermore, suppose that s 1 < . Then DTCA may permit a type q = 1 …rm to credibly signal its quality to patients -and increase sales of its drug -as follows. Suppose that patients expect the drug …rm to advertise if and only if q = 1. If no DTCA is observed, they therefore infer that q > 1 and follow the PKBE strategy in the consultation phase. 20 If they observe a = 1, they infer that q = 1. Since s 1 < the PKBE cannot exist, but the
Are patient beliefs rational in this scenario? Let
denote the probability that^ is rejected in a CE of the consultation game with F = F q . It is optimal for a type q = 1 …rm to choose a = 1 i¤
The left-hand side is the di¤erence between expected revenue under the CE, which is
and expected revenue under the PKBE, which is
It is optimal for a type q = 1 …rm to choose a = 1 i¤ this di¤erence is at least as high as its advertising cost, K. Similarly, it is optimal for a type q > 1
Patient beliefs are therefore rational provided K is not too high -so (8) is satis…ed -and is high enough to ensure (9) . Under these conditions, DTCA is credible. It is also e¤ective -it switches behaviour in the consultation from the PKBE to the CE strategies for F = F 1 , thereby increasing sales of drug .
The following Proposition and its Corollary formalise this intuition.
Proposition 3 Suppose s 1 < s, where s is de…ned by (1) for F = P n q=1 q F q , and further suppose that
Letting x = max q2f2;:::;ng
the following is an equilibrium strategy pro…le i¤ x:
The Drug Firm: advertises truthfully if q = 1 and does not advertise otherwise.
The Physician: follows her PKBE strategy if a 2 f?; 2; :::; ng, recommends if a = 1 and s > s 1 , and recommends otherwise.
The Patient: always accepts recommendation^ , accepts recommendation if a 2 f?; 2; :::; ng, and accepts recommendation^ with probability 1 1 if a = 1.
Corollary 1 If
K < max q2f2;:::;ng
the equilibrium in Proposition 3 requires > 0.
The condition s 1 < s in Proposition 3 ensures that the consultation game possesses a PKBE when patient beliefs are given by F = P n q=1 q F q , while if patient beliefs are F = F 1 then the CE exists but not the PKBE.
Condition (10) ensures that the highest quality drug …rm is prepared to advertise if doing so switches play from the PKBE strategies to the CE strategies (for F = F 1 ) in the consultation phase.
Proposition 3 makes it clear that it is not only truth-in-advertising regulation that supports the credibility of DTCA. The direct cost of advertising also plays a role, as in Milgrom and Roberts (1986). If condition (11) in
Corollary 1 fails, then DTCA may still occur in equilibrium even if content is unregulated. However, excluding this special case, truth-in-advertising regulation is critical to the credibility of DTCA (i.e., x > 0).
Closer inspection of the equilibrium in Proposition 3 also reveals an important role for the physician in sustaining DTCA. If a = 1 and s < s 1 the doctor will try to dissuade the patient from taking drug and will be successful with probability 1 1 . This discourages lower quality drug producers from falsely claiming that q = 1. Assumption 3 implies that F q FOSD F q+1 for any q < n, so the doctor's reluctance to prescribe when s < s 1 is more costly for a low-quality drug producer than for a higher quality producer.
This also contributes to the credibility of DTCA.
We do not attempt a complete welfare analysis, as our model omits too many of the market failures that complicate the picture (such as the moral hazard e¤ects of insurance on consumer demand for pharmaceuticals). However, it is interesting to compare the payo¤s of the players in the equilibrium of Proposition 3 relative to their payo¤s in the default scenario in which DTCA is banned (or when is too low to support it). In the latter scenario, doctors and patients get their PKBE payo¤s, and the drug manufacturer gets the expected pro…t from the PKBE level of prescribing.
If the drug …rm is of type q > 1 then no player is a¤ected by moving from the default scenario to the equilibrium in Proposition 3. However, if q = 1 then the physician is made worse o¤ -she no longer gets her way in the consultation -while the drug …rm is (weakly) better o¤ -it (weakly) increases its expected pro…t through the use of DTCA. The patient's expected welfare (under the true distribution F 1 ) changes by:
where the inequality uses the fact that 0 < s 1 < and the …rst equality uses the de…nition of s 1 . Therefore, patients and drug manufacturers gain at the expense of physicians (and their employers).
False DTCA
In this section we show that false advertising can also be sustained in equilibrium. Of course, the notion of equilibrium precludes patients being mislead.
They are aware that some DTCA may be false and form their beliefs accordingly. Nevertheless, it may be pro…table for some types to advertise falsely in equilibrium.
To describe such an equilibrium, it is useful to de…ne
If patients learn via DTCA that q 2 f1; 2g, then they form the belief
For these beliefs, the consultation game has a CE provided > s 12 and recommendation^ is rejected with probability 12 in that CE. Once again, the credibility of advertising rests on both the direct advertising cost K and the expected …ne . Provided K is not too high, the role of regulation is critical (Corollary 2).
As with the equilibrium of Proposition 3, the doctor also plays an important role in supporting the credibility of DTCA. In fact, her role is even more important here. 
Since F 2 ( ) < F q ( ) for any q > 2 (an implication of Assumption 3), we have x 12 < x 12 . Intuitively, the doctor's ability to reduce prescribing of drug when s < s 12 is what allows drug quality to a¤ect incentives for false advertising: lower quality drugs su¤er more from the doctor's push-back, as they face a higher probability that s < s 12 . If the doctor cannot e¤ectively dispute DTCA, then all types q > 1 have the same incentive to make the false claim a = 1. This undermines the credibility of DTCA.
In general, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for x 12 x 12 is
for all q > 2. This says that a type 2 …rm experiences a weakly higher increase in expected revenue than a type q > 2 …rm, when moving from the PKBE to the CE (for patient beliefs F 12 ). This means that a type 2 …rm has more incentive to send misleading DTCA than any lower quality type.
The Supplementary Material contains a simple example for which x 12 < x 12 .
We may re-express (14) in the equivalent form:
Recall that Assumption 3 implies
.
Since
( 1 12 )
condition (15) requires that the di¤erence
be su¢ ciently large, with the required di¤erence increasing in 12 . The less e¤ective is the push-back from the doctor (i.e., the higher is 12 ), the harder it is to sustain the equilibrium in Proposition 4.
Let us compare the player payo¤s in the equilibrium of Proposition 4 to those in a scenario in which DTCA is banned (or a scenario in which is too low, or too high, to support it). If q > 2, there is no e¤ect. If q 2 f1; 2g the payo¤ to the drug …rm increases and that to the doctor falls. For any given q 2 f1; 2g, the patient's expected welfare (under the true distribution Once again, patients and drug …rms bene…t from DTCA at the expense of doctors.
It is also straightforward to observe that x 12 x, since
It follows that if the equilibria of Propositions 3 and 4 both exist, then
x 12 x 12 x. In other words, higher expected …nes are necessary to sustain the equilibrium with purely truthful DTCA than to sustain the equilibrium with false DTCA.
Discussion
Let us summarise our main conclusions. We consider a managed care environment in which doctors are imperfect agents of their patients. Assuming that patients always follow their physicians'recommendations when DTCA is banned (i.e., a PKBE is played), the introduction of DTCA may facilitate market stealing. Truth-in-advertising regulation plays an important role in supporting the credibility on which advertising relies to be e¤ective. (i) whenever DTCA is observed in equilibrium, 22 it always results in a strictly higher level of prescribing of drug than under a PKBE; and (ii) the expected 22 Or rather, in a restricted equilibrium, as de…ned in the Supplementary Material. …ne must exceed a lower bound to support any equilibrium with purely truthful advertising, and must fall between an upper and lower bound for equilibria with both truthful and false advertising. 23 Some key assumptions underpin our results. The remainder of this section discusses these assumptions.
We assume that physicians are biased against the new drug and that patients are aware of this. As discussed in the Introduction, there is evidence that managed care schemes place e¤ective supply-side constraints on physicians'prescribing of expensive new drugs, and that patients are aware of this pressure.
We have also implicitly assumed that physicians cannot credibly convey information about the state s to their patients -they merely recommend one drug or the other. Is this reasonable? Perhaps a doctor could present test results to convince her patient that drug is unsuitable for him? We would argue, however, that while the test results may be veri…able to the patient, their proper interpretation is not. Specialised expertise is required to ascertain the relability of the test and to understand the signi…cance of the results.
In the model with DTCA, we assume that drug advertisements must specify a particular quality level. This re ‡ects U.S. regulations, which require …rms to specify side-e¤ects of the drug (and, if known, what can be done to lower the chance of experiencing them). The FDA sends out a warning letter if it believes that information has been left out. 24 Therefore, it seems reasonable to restrict messages to precise claims about quality. One may think, for example, of quality as a list of side-e¤ects, with q a proper subset of q + 1. The advertisement a = q is the claim that q is a complete list of all side-e¤ects, not a claim that the elements of q are amongst the side e¤ects. We assume that the latter claim, which might be described by the 23 Conditions for these bounds to be non-trivial may, of course, be substantive -as per Corollaries 1 and 2. 24 For instance, in the case of Vitrase, it sent out a warning letter in February 2005
because its advertisements did not include crucial risk information. set fq; q + 1; :::; ng, is excluded by the nature of the regulations. 25 The model also assumes a common …ne for false advertising, irrespective of the level of falsehood. Relaxing this assumption would, we believe, only strengthen our results. Consider, for example, the equilibrium in Proposition 4. This relies on type q = 2 being willing to lie, but not types q > 2. If the latter falsehoods, being more serious, were punished more heavily, this would make the equilibrium even easier to support.
On the other hand, relaxing our assumption of a …xed advertising cost K could potentially weaken results. If …rms can a¤ect this cost by choosing di¤erent levels of advertising intensity then patients may be able to infer quality from advertising expenditure, as in Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
DTCA might then be an e¤ective signal of quality even in the absence of regulation, since high-quality types can separate themselves by advertising more intensively. However, in practice, patients would be hard put to estimate the amount of money spent on advertising. We believe that our model, in which patients need only observe the fact, rather than the level, of advertising is more plausible. It is also useful for illustrating how advertising can be credible even without exploiting the intensity dimension.
We further assume that patients can observe the expected …ne , and this assumption might also be questioned. The audit probability is particularly di¢ cult to observe and need not remain constant over time. In- If patients have an unreasonably optimistic expectation about the FDA's regulatory oversight there is potential for even greater patient-physician con-‡ict from DTCA than our model might suggest. For example, suppose patients believe that is large enough to support the equilibrium in Proposition 3 and therefore that …rms have no incentive to advertise falsely. If, in reality, is much smaller than patients' expectations, and low enough to induce some low quality types to make false claims, then patients will naïvely believe these claims. If a patient observes a false claim from a low quality …rm, it is highly likely that the physician will recommend and be challenged by the patient, whereas a properly informed patient would have accepted the physician's recommendation in the same state. There will consequently be higher levels of con ‡ict and higher levels of prescribing of drug . This (albeit informal) argument suggests that imperfectly understood regulation can induce more false advertising than a publicly announced repeal of all regulation. 
Conclusion
The appropriate regulation of DTCA is an important policy question. The existence of DTCA suggests that pharmaceutical …rms believe it is e¤ective in driving sales, and many detractors claim that it "distorts" prescribing towards more expensive drugs. In thinking about whether and how DTCA might in ‡uence prescribing, one must consider how drug advertising can be su¢ ciently credible to undermine the role of the "learned intermediary" -the physician.
This paper is the …rst to present a signalling theory in which the credibility of DTCA is endogenised. The model also helps to explain the role of regulation in supporting the credibility of DTCA to a cynical patient population, and hence to sustaining the viability of advertising in equilibrium.
We do not undertake any formal welfare analysis here, so any conclusions about the appropriate regulatory responses to DTCA can only be speculative.
Analysing the welfare e¤ects of DTCA is not straightforward (Danzon and Keu¤el, 2014) . There are a plethora of market failures, including moral hazard in the insurance or HMO market, dynamic and static ine¢ ciency in the market for new drugs, 26 and asymmetric information in the market for phsyician services. A welfare analysis would need to consider all these market failures simultaneously.
Of course, if the policy concern is solely with false advertising, then one simple solution is to set the expected …ne extremely high. But one of the lessons from our model is that marginal increments to expected …nes might have unpredictable e¤ects. The conditions for existence of equilibria with false DTCA impose a lower -as well as an upper -bound on the expected …ne.
Some detractors of DTCA also worry about harm from truthful advertising. They argue that the physician performs a useful service by rationing expensive drugs so that scarce health dollars are used more e¢ ciently in an environment with high levels of insurance coverage. If the policy aim is to reduce all DTCA, and an outright ban is infeasible, then complete de-regulation could be one option to consider as a potential means of undermining the credibility of advertising.
27 26 By dynamic issues we mean the incentives for R&D while the static issues are about the monopolistic pricing of drugs resulting from patent protection. 27 If such an approach were to be followed, it would be important to run a public awareness campaign to alert consumers to the unregulated status of DTCA -recall the discussion in Section 5.
and both recommendations occur with strictly positive probability -see the discussion following Lemma 1. It follows that p ^ is optimal for posterior beliefs that condition F on [s ; 1], and p (^ ) is optimal for posterior beliefs that condition F on [s; s ]. It also follows that any PBE of this form will satisfy the IC, since there are no o¤-equilibrium recommendations. Figure 2 depicts the optimal patient responses as a function of s 2 (!; 1).
To construct Figure 2 we de…nê
This parameter determines the critical s value at which the patient's optimal decision switches from accepting to rejecting r =^ , as veri…ed in the following lemma.
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Lemma 3 Given s 2 (!; 1), the condition
is equivalent to s ŝ.
Condition (18) We may use
as a one-dimensional parameterisation of the optimal patient response to 
It is easily checked that determines a one-to-one mapping from the set of scenarios described by (20) - (22) . If the optimal s lies in (!; 1), then it coincides with the state at which the doctor is indi¤erent about which drug to recommend: Observe from (20) and (21) It remains to show that the PKBE Pareto dominates any other equilibrium under condition (5) . Rather than enumerate all equilibria, we proceed indirectly. We will divide (putative) equilibria into two classes -possibly empty -and show that, for each class, any member must be Pareto dominated by the PKBE.
We classify equilibria as follows: In such an equilibrium (if one exists), the sole equilibrium recommendation is made with probability 1 in every state. The patient's treatment lottery is therefore the same in every state. Since < 1, it follows that the physician is strictly worse o¤ in any Case I equilibrium than in the PKBE. The physician obtains her favourite treatment in every state under the PKBE, and < 1 implies that this favourite treatment is in some states and in others. An equilibrium in which the same treatment lottery occurs in every state must be strictly worse.
What about the patient? The patient's expected payo¤ under the
Denote this payo¤ by . Since < 1, we have > 0 from Assumption
In a Case I equilibrium, the patient learns nothing from the doctor's equilibrium recommendation, so his expected equilibrium payo¤ is no higher than that from receiving his ex ante optimal treatment in all states without con ‡ict. If he receives in all states, his expected payo¤ is zero. If he receives in all states, his expected payo¤ is
We therefore deduce from (24) that the patient's PKBE payo¤ is at least as high as his payo¤ in any Case I equilibrium.
It follows that the PKBE Pareto dominates any Case I equilibrium.
Case II. Equilibria in which both recommendations are made with positive probability.
We restrict attention to Case II equilibria which are responsive -otherwise the welfare analysis is the same as for Case I. By Lemma 1, there exists some s with F (s ) 2 (0; 1) such that recommendation r is made in states s < s , to which the patient responds by choosing with probability p (r) = , and recommendation r 0 is made in states s > s , to which the patient responds by choosing with probability p (r 0 ) = 0 > . Unless this equilibrium coincides with the PKBE (i.e., s = , r =^ , r 0 =^ , = 0 and 0 = 1), the physician is strictly worse o¤ than under the PKBE. 30 Once again, it su¢ ces to show that the patient is no better o¤. 30 More precisely, since 2 (0; 1), there must be a non-degenerate interval of states around in which the physician is strictly worse o¤. By Assumption 1, there is strictly positive ex ante probability of s falling within this interval.
Consider the patient's expected payo¤ in such an equilibrium (i.e., a responsive Case II equilibrium). We will show that this payo¤ is no greater than .
If 0 < 1, it is optimal for the patient to choose t = in response to either recommendation. It follows that her equilibrium expected payo¤ is no better than the payo¤ from receiving treatment in every state without con ‡ict. The latter payo¤ is zero, which is no greater than -recall (24) .
Suppose, then, that 0 = 1. That is, the patient chooses in response to recommendation r 0 .
If r 0 =^ (hence r =^ ), then either the equilibrium coincides with the PKBE or else > 0. (If = 0 the physician's optimal strategy implies s = , so we have a PKBE.) If > 0, it is optimal for the patient to choose t = in response to either recommendation. It follows that his equilibrium payo¤ is no greater than if he were to receive treatment in every state without con ‡ict. From Case I, we already know that is at least as high as this -see (24) again.
Finally, consider equilibria with r 0 =^ (hence r =^ ).
If
= 0 in such an equilibrium, then optimal physician behaviour implies s = -both recommendations provoke con ‡ict, so the doctor recommends the one that results in her favoured treatment. In such an equilibrium (if it exists) the patient receives the same treatment as under the PKBE, but there is con ‡ict with probability 1. The patient is clearly worse o¤ in such an equilibrium than under the PKBE.
Finally, we show that an equilibrium with r 0 =^ and 2 (0; 1) is precluded by condition (5). For such an equilibrium to exist, it is necessary that Z s s s dF (s) = F (s ) c p (25) to ensure the patient is willing to randomise following recommendation ^ . Since 0 = 1, optimal physician behaviour implies that s satis…es
In particular, s so (25) contradicts (5).
Thus, in any Case II equilibrium consistent with (5), the patient is no better o¤ than under the PKBE.
Cases I and II exhaust all possibilities. In summary, we have shown that when condition (5) holds, any non-PKBE equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the PKBE. In particular, the doctor is strictly better o¤ and the patient no worse o¤.
Proof of Proposition 3.
The following Lemma will be useful in the sequel:
Lemma 4 IfF = P q2Q q F q for some set Q f1; 2; :::; ng and some constants q 2 (0; 1] satisfying P q2Q q = 1, then for any t > 0 where q = min Q and q = max Q.
Proof. We may write 1
SinceF (t) = P n q=1 q F q (t), the right-hand side of (26) If the patient observes a 2 f2; :::; ng, he cannot use Bayes'Rule to form beliefs. We shall suppose that the patient forms the belief F n in these circumstances (but continues to believe that the physician will play according to the equilibrium strategies). Note that a drug …rm of type q = n could 31 This follows from the observation thatF = 1 F 1 + (1 1 ) F . We may therefore write 1
where the …rst inequality uses Lemma 4 and the second uses Assumption 3. The conditional mean of F is therefore lower than that ofF .
conceivably bene…t from such a deviation, since K < R by condition (10) . It follows that these o¤-equilibrium beliefs satisfy the IC. Given these patient beliefs, the PKBE strategies are sequentially rational by Proposition 1, since we deduce s n from s and Lemma 4.
It remains to check that the drug …rm's strategy is optimal. The drug …rm can either choose a = 1 and induce the CE continuation (for patient beliefs F = F 1 ), or choose a 2 f?; 2; :::; ng and induce the PKBE continuation.
Since advertising is costly, it is clear that the optimal choice must be a = 1 or a = ?. We must show that type q = 1 (weakly) prefers a = 1 while type q > 1 (weakly) prefers a = ?.
As per the discussion prior to Proposition 3, it is optimal for type q = 1
to choose a = 1 i¤
which is satis…ed by assumption (10). It is optimal for type q > 1 to choose
Therefore, we have an equilibrium i¤ x.
Proof of Corollary 1. The right-hand side of (27) strictly exceeds zero for some q > 1 i¤ (11).
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof follows similar lines to that of Proposition 3.
A patient who observes a = 1 forms belief
Since s 12 < it is sequentially rational for the doctor and patient to play the CE strategies (for belief F 12 ) in the consultation phase. A patient who observes a = ?, forms the belief
Using Lemma 4 and the fact that s, we deduce (by analogous reasoning to that in the proof of Proposition 3) that it is sequentially rational for the doctor and patient to play the PKBE strategies in the consultation phase.
Finally, we may assume that a patient who observes the o¤-equilibrium advertisement a 2 f2; :::; ng forms the belief F n . Since K < R by condition (12), these beliefs satisfy the IC. Given these patient beliefs, the PKBE strategies are sequentially rational, since s n can be deduced from Lemma 4 and the fact that s.
We next verify that the drug …rm's strategy is optimal. By familiar reasoning, each type of drug …rm will either choose a = 1 or a = ?. We must show that types q 2 f1; 2g weakly prefer a = 1 and all other types weakly prefer a = ?.
A type q = 1 …rm weakly prefers a = 1 i¤
which is condition (12) . A type q = 2 …rm weakly prefers a = 1 i¤
Similarly, a type q > 2 …rm weakly prefers a = ? i¤
Thus, the equilibrium exists i¤ x 12 x 12 .
Proof of Corollary 2. Condition (13) is equivalent to x 12 > 0.
